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Highlights1
• With more consumers installing solar PV panels, it makes sense to depart 
from the historical practice of volumetric distribution network tariffs with 
net-metering.
• However, regulators face many practical difficulties when redesigning the 
distribution network tariff design. Typically, there is a trade-off between cost-
reflectiveness and fairness.
• We illustrate the cost-reflectiveness versus fairness trade-off and we find 
that some cost-reflectiveness can be sacrificed to limit the distributional 
impact resulting from tariff redesign. 
• However, this works only up to a certain point without compromising grid 
cost recovery. If grid costs are mainly sunk, and cost-reflective charges are 
hard to implement, then smaller passive consumers are always worse off –
tools other than ‘standard tariff options’ are needed to keep distributional 
impacts under control while limiting distortions.
1. This policy brief is based on RSCAS Research Paper No. 2018/19, titled ‘’Least-
Cost Distribution Network Tariff Design in Theory and Practice’’ by Schittekatte, 
T. and Meeus, L. Available at: http://cadmus.eui.eu//handle/1814/53804. Details 
about the assumptions, data, and formulation of the mathematical model can be 
found in the research paper.
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1. Introduction 
Technological breakthroughs at the consumer-
side are challenging the use of volumetric network 
charges. Specifically, volumetric charges with net-
metering, implying that a consumer will be charged 
for the net consumption from the grid over a certain 
period (e.g. month), are deemed inadequate with the 
massive deployment of solar PV. Consumers with 
solar PV pay far lower network charges but still rely 
on the distribution grid as much as they did before. 
This means that if cost recovery is respected, con-
sumers that have not installed solar PV would have 
to contribute more. 
There is no easy fix for distribution network tariff 
design. Next to volumetric charges, the two other tra-
ditional network tariff design options are capacity-
based and fixed network charges. In Section 2 we 
show that if the regulatory toolbox is limited to these 
three traditional options, it will be hard to design a 
distribution network tariff that is cost-reflective and 
future-oriented, while at the same time also fair in 
the allocation of costs between active and passive 
domestic customers. In Section 3 we discuss show 
that other, more creative, regulatory tricks are needed 
to combine and satisfy different policy objectives.
2. The Limits of Traditional Distribution 
Network Tariff Design
A more cost-reflective tariff will not necessarily be 
deemed fair. In what follows we illustrate this trade-
off by using a game-theoretical model. Namely, we 
develop a game in which the regulator can decide 
about the distribution network tariff (volumetric, 
capacity and/or fixed charges) while anticipating the 
reaction of the active consumers to the tariff design. 
The regulator has to respect the condition that all 
grid costs need to be recovered from the network 
tariffs. The objectives of the regulator and the active 
consumers are different. The active consumers are 
self-interest pursuing, i.e. they can invest in solar PV 
and batteries and will do so if it results in lowering 
their private costs to serve their electricity needs. 
The objective of the regulator is instead to set the 
network tariff in a way that the actions of the active 
consumers not only benefit themselves but also the 
system as a whole.
In Figure and Table 1 below we show a result from 
the model. All results are relative to the reference. As 
a reference we have the ’as-it-used-to-be-scenario’, 
i.e. no consumer installs any solar panel or bat-
tery, and the network charges are volumetric. There 
are three key assumptions. First, some future grid 
investments can be influenced by the way the grid 
is used, other investments are made in the past and 
their costs are sunk. Each country faces a different 
situation regarding the relative importance of pro-
spective versus sunk costs. This depends on the grid 
investment cycle they are in and how local demand 
evolves. In this example, we assume the grid costs 
to originally consists of 50 % prospective and 50 
% sunk grid costs. Second, we know that capacity-
based charges are an imperfect proxy for the pro-
spective network cost. Even if the individual peak 
demands of consumers are reduced, it does not mean 
that the future investment costs reduce proportion-
ally. We assume that a reduction of 1 kW individual 
peak results in a 0.75 kW reduction in the invest-
ment need, which is most probably an optimistic 
assumption. Last, we model active consumers with a 
slightly higher electricity consumption than passive 
consumers. We assume that in the reference scenario 
the network charges paid by the passive consumers 
are 33 % lower than the network charges paid by 
the typically more affluent active consumers (before 
they are enabled to invest in solar PV and batteries). 
It can be seen in Figure 1 that when the active con-
sumers are enabled to invest in solar PV and bat-
teries, the tariff design that gives the best result from 
a system point of view becomes a mix of capacity-
based and fixed network charges in this example. 
In the next two subsections these results are further 
explained and discussed.
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Limitations of Capacity-Based Charges to 
Reflect Future Grid Costs
A popular alternative brought forward to replace 
volumetric network charges with net-metering 
are capacity-based charges.1 With capacity-based 
charges, consumers pay for the grid according to 
their peak demand, e.g. their maximum hourly or fif-
teen-minute power off-take measured over a month. 
The rationale is that these kinds of charges are more 
cost-reflective as the main network cost driver is the 
maximum hosting capacity of the lines and feeders. 
However, in practice, a truly cost-reflective tariff is 
hard to implement and would need a very fine tem-
poral and locational granularity. The maximal power 
usage of all individual consumers does not neces-
sarily coincide and the distribution network is actu-
ally a layer of different networks with possibly dif-
ferent network peaks.
However, because of the fact that some prospec-
tive grid costs can be reduced by lowering the peak 
demand, some part of the grid costs are recuperated 
with capacity-based charges. With capacity-based 
charges in place, the active consumers are incen-
tivised to lower their individual peak demand. And 
they do so as the reduction in their grid charges is 
1.  In the US context capacity-based charges are often called ‘demand charges’.
worth investment cost of the batteries they need to 
install. As a result, the coincident peak demand at 
the feeders lowers, and grid cost can be reduced.  The 
total savings of grid reinforcement costs (around 10 
% as can be seen from Figure 1) are slightly higher 
than the total costs of all batteries purchased by the 
active consumers, which results in an overall net 
reduction of total system costs of 0.3 %. It is exactly 
these grid cost savings that are transferred to the 
active consumers through reduced network charges.
However, caution is needed when implementing 
standard capacity-based tariffs. With the rise of elec-
trical storage and demand response, similar risks as 
with net-metering and solar PV can arise if capacity-
based charges are badly implemented; active con-
sumers lower their grid contributions by lowering 
their peak demand while the total grid costs would 
remain basically unchanged. Again, other, passive, 
consumers would have to contribute more to allow 
for grid cost recovery. Therefore, as capacity-based 
charges are an imperfect proxy of the network cost 
driver, significantly less than half of the total grid 
costs are recuperated by capacity-based charges, 
even if the ratio of prospective over sunk costs is 
50/50.
Figure and Table 1: Illustration of the result of a run of the model with active consumers enabled to invest 
in solar PV and batteries. 50 % active and 50 % passive consumers assumed. 
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Limitations of Fixed Network Charges to 
Recover Residual Network Costs
How then can we recuperate the residual remaining 
grid costs, which are mostly sunk? The most cost-
reflective tariff in this case is one that does not reflect 
any cost. Fixed network charges (e.g. in € per connec-
tion) would do the job. The only way to avoid paying 
fixed network charges would be to go offgrid, which 
does not seem realistic in most parts of the world 
today. However, in many countries there is strong 
opposition to high fixed network charges. It is often 
argued that if fixed network charges replaced a large 
share of the historic volumetric network charges, 
a high proportion of the network costs would be 
shifted from often richer high-usage consumers to 
often poorer lower-usage consumers.2 
Figure 1 shows that the least-cost tariff design in this 
example with 50 % of active consumers also con-
sists of a fairly large share of uniform fixed network 
charges. The regulator chooses this kind of charge 
in order to recuperate the residual part of network 
costs without distorting the active consumer’s deci-
sions. But the fixed charges applied are uniform 
across all consumers. This means that smaller pas-
sive consumers will see an increase in their network 
charges when compared to the reference case, even 
though their electricity demand from the grid has 
not changed. More precisely, Table 1 shows that in 
this example the least-cost tariff results in a 15.6 % 
increase of the network charges paid by the passive 
consumers.
Limitations of Reaching Fairness with all 
Three Options
Even though the proposed tariff for this example is 
the least-cost solution, opposition against negative 
distributional impacts from tariff redesign is real. 
Therefore, we test what would happen if we constrain 
2.  Besides, also early solar PV adopters have based their business case on volumetric charges and energy efficiency advocates 
fiercly oppose increased fixed network charges. See e.g. ‘Ohio utility seeks to double its fixed distribution charges’, link: 
https://energynews.us/2016/08/26/midwest/ohio-utility-seeks-to-double-its-fixed-distribution-charges/
the increase of network charges of the passive con-
sumers when obtaining the new tariff proposal. By 
doing so, we can ‘sacrifice’ some cost-reflectiveness 
in order to lower fairness concerns. Two opposing 
forces are working in this case. On the one hand, 
by lowering the fixed network charges, the fairness 
issue decreases. But by resorting to other network 
tariff components which are needed to ensure full 
grid cost recovery (volumetric charges or an increase 
in capacity-based charges), the network tariff will be 
distortionary. This implies that active consumers 
can exploit opportunities that might be beneficial 
for themselves but which are not necessarily optimal 
from a system point of view. 
Moreover, the benefits active consumers obtain in 
this way come at the expense of passive consumers, 
thus aggravating the fairness issue once again. These 
two forces can be played out until the moment 
the model becomes unfeasible, i.e. there is no way 
to recover all grid costs while limiting the fairness 
concern. In this example, it is possible to reduce the 
increase in network charges paid by the passive con-
sumers from 15.6% down to 10%. After, grid cost 
recovery is not anymore guaranteed. This reduction 
of the distributional impact of tariff redesign comes 
with a cost. Namely, in order to reduce the increase 
of the network charges of the passive consumers by 
5.6 percentage points, 0.4 percentage points of wel-
fare are sacrificed. The total system costs are now 
even slightly higher than the total system costs in 
the reference case. Paradoxically, with a regulatory 
toolbox limited to volumetric, capacity and standard 
fixed charges, the rise of active consumers enabled to 
invest in solar PV and batteries results in a situation 
which is worse both from the system and passive 
consumer perspective when compared to the refer-
ence case without active consumers. The proposed 
network tariff in this case is a three-part tariff, con-
sisting of a mix of capacity-based charges, (lowered) 
5 ■  Limits of traditional distribution network tariff design and options to move beyond
fixed network charges and net-purchase volumetric 
charges. This result shows that even when the accu-
mulated electricity volume flowing through the net-
work does not drive the costs, it can make sense to 
recuperate part of the grid costs through (net pur-
chased) volumetric charges to reduce fairness con-
cerns.3
Nonetheless, fairness is even more of a challenge as 
it goes beyond cost allocation among domestic con-
sumers but also lives between voltage levels. Histori-
cally, electricity flowed from the high voltage levels 
all the way down. As a result, it was acceptable that 
transmission grid users did not pay for distribution 
while distribution grid users paid for transmission 
too. Also, within the distribution grid, this cascading 
practice is applied with domestic grid users paying 
more than industrial clients connected to higher 
voltage distribution networks. To the extent that 
the direction of the flows is changing, also this cas-
cading principle could be challenged from a fairness 
but also from a cost-efficiency point of view. New 
entities such as Local Energy Communities (LECs) 
which unite active consumers will only make this 
debate more topical in the near future.
3. Options to Move Beyond
We showed that if the regulator only has the three 
options available that we consider in this policy 
brief, it will be difficult to implement a fair tariff 
design. This is especially true if the proportion of 
sunk grid costs is high and cost-reflective charges are 
hard to implement. However, in practice, our results 
regarding fairness might be overestimated as such 
issues can be improved through other solutions than 
standard tariff design. 
3.  This is true when excluding losses. Net-purchased volumetric tariffs are volumetric tariffs for which only the gross energy 
withdrawn from the network is accounted for in the calulcation of network charges.
4.  As also discussed in: Pollitt, Michael G. 2018. “Electricity Network Charging in the Presence of Distributed Energy Re-
sources: Principles, Problems and Solutions.” Economics of Energy & Environmental Policy 7 (1): 89–104. doi:10.5547/2160-
5890.7.1.mpol and MIT Energy Initiative. 2016.’’ Utility of the Future’’. An MIT Energy Initiative Response to an Industry 
in Transition.
Negative distributional effects could be remedied 
through specific low-income programmes. Another 
solution would be not to implement uniform fixed 
network charge as we did, but to differentiate the 
fixed network charges per consumer or consumer 
groups without distorting the use of electricity, 
e.g. by income, property value, property size, kW 
connection capacity.4 It might also be possible to 
improve fairness by introducing some form of tax-
ation for active consumers. However, taxation is 
also difficult to implement and could conflict with 
other public policy goals. In the case of high sunk 
grid costs, under-recovery of the grid costs could 
be an option as full cost recovery leads to ineffi-
ciencies. Not recovered sunk network costs could 
be recuperated through other means than the elec-
tricity bill, an option also discussed in the report 
by the MIT Energy Initiative. An alternative could 
be to let taxpayers pay for these costs, as is done for 
roads in some countries. Lastly, instead of capacity-
based charges, time-varying network charges might 
be more suitable to reflect the underlying network 
costs, even though they remain hard to implement 
and should comply with other regulatory objectives 
such as predictability and simplicity.
On the other hand, our results could underestimate 
the challenges of implementing cost-reflective and 
fair distribution network tariffs in practice. We did 
not assume policy costs and taxes in the electricity 
bill to interfere with the analysis. In most coun-
tries the share of these costs in the electricity bill is 
increasing year by year and the way these costs are 
recuperated from consumers, mostly volumetrically, 
can seriously distort network tariff design and can 
aggravate cost-reflectiveness and fairness issues.
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